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Application of the Ultra Vires Doctrine
I. INTRODUCTION
The Washington Supreme Court has given new life to the
old, but very powerful, ultra vires doctrine.1 In two recent deci-
sions, Noel v. Cole2 and Chemical Bank v. Washington Public
Power Supply System,3 the Washington Supreme Court applied
different forms of the doctrine to invalidate contracts between
public entities and private parties. In Chemical Bank, the court
used the form known as primary ultra vires4 in holding that
Washington public utility districts and municipalities did not
have statutory authority to enter into contracts that obligated
them to pay for bonds sold to finance the construction of two
aborted nuclear power plants.' Six months earlier in Noel, the
court applied the form of the doctrine known as secondary ultra
1. The term ultra vires is used to describe actions of public or private entities that
are beyond the scope of the powers granted to them or outside the purposes for which
they were created. See C. RHYNE, THE LAW OF LocAL GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS § 27.3
(1980). This Comment will discuss application of the ultra vires doctrine to the contract
activities of public sector entities.
2. 98 Wash. 2d 375, 655 P.2d 245 (1982).
3. 99 Wash. 2d 772, 666 P.2d 329 (1983).
4. The term primary ultra vires is a hybrid of previous descriptions for the form of
the ultra vires doctrine that finds authority to contract completely lacking and recovery
under any theory unavailable.
[I]n so far as acts on the part of the municipality, without or beyond the power
or authority conferred by law, are concerned, such acts fall, generally speaking,
into two classes: those which are primarily, and those which are secondarily,
ultra vires. In the first classification, belong such acts as a municipality has no
authority whatsoever to perform; in the second classification, fall those which
are within the lawful powers of the municipal corporation, but which are void
because of some irregularity in the procedure leading up to the act.
Jones v. City of Centralia, 157 Wash. 194, 218, 289 P. 3, 11 (1930). See infra notes 16-33
and accompanying text.
5. 99 Wash. 2d at 798, 666 P.2d at 342.
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vires 6 in determining that the State Department of Natural
Resources improperly exercised its authority to sell public tim-
ber when it failed to comply with provisions of the State Envi-
ronmental Policy Act (SEPA).7
The Washington Supreme Court erred in Chemical Bank by
misapplying the distinctions between primary and secondary
ultra vires that it had articulated in Edwards v. City of Renton8
and reaffirmed in Noel.9 In the interest of consistent, fair, and
logical results, the court will ultimately need to retreat from the
very technical interpretation of primary ultra vires that it
applied in Chemical Bank. Otherwise, the court may find itself
splitting hairs over the exact scope of enabling legislation when
the statutes and subsequent legislative acts manifest approval of
the actions taken.10
II. DEVELOPMENT OF ULTRA VIRES IN WASHINGTON
A. Introduction
Municipal corporations, public utility districts, and state
agencies possess only the powers granted in their enabling legis-
lation.1 Legislatures, as creators of these subordinate units of
government, may enlarge, abridge, qualify, or even repeal the
6. Secondary ultra vires is a hybrid of previous descriptions for the form of the doc-
trine in which the public entity has authority to act, but carries out its action in an
improper manner. Recovery is possible under a quasi-contract theory. See Jones v. City
of Centralia, 157 Wash. 194, 218, 289 P. 3, 11 (1930). See infra notes 34-39 and accompa-
nying text.
7. 98 Wash. 2d at 380, 655 P.2d at 249. The Noel decision was based upon the
court's analysis of the secondary ultra vires doctrine in Edwards v. City of Renton, 67
Wash. 2d 598, 409 P.2d 153 (1965).
8. 67 Wash. 2d 598, 603, 409 P.2d 153, 157 (1965). See infra notes 75-82 and accom-
panying text.
9. Noel, however, was consistent with the court's historic approach to the doctrine.
See infra notes 83-102 and accompanying text.
10. This Comment will argue that the court's narrow interpretation of the language
authorizing municipalities and public utility districts to acquire electric energy that led
to its finding of primary ultra vires was inconsistent with its previous approach to inter-
preting municipal power.
11. "Municipal corporations are political subdivisions of the state, and in the
absence of constitutional restrictions, the legislature has absolute control over the num-
ber, nature and duration of the powers conferred and the extent of the territory over
which they may be exercised." C. RHYNE, supra note 1, § 4.2. For example, WASH. REv.
CODE § 35.01.010 (1983) defines a first class city as one having at least twenty thousand
people at the time of its organization or reorganization. WASH. REV. CODE § 35.22.010
(1983) requires first class cities to be organized and governed in accordance with WASH.
CONST. art. XI, § 10. WASH. REV. CODE § 35.22.020 (1983) requires first class cities to
provide for the organization and performance of their powers in a charter.
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powers of municipal corporations."
Historically, courts have used the ultra vires doctrine as a
tool to control the actions of public entities." Contracts that
exceeded the scope of an agency's legislatively granted authority
were declared void and unenforceable. 4 Thus, the doctrine pro-
tected citizens from the consequences of improvident acts of
their government.' 5 The emergence of two different forms of the
doctrine, however, created some confusion. An analysis of how
the doctrine is applied must begin with an explanation of each
form.
B. Primary Ultra Vires
The Washington Supreme Court has defined a primary
ultra vires act as one that a municipality has no authority what-
soever to perform.'" Since public entities derive authority from
state constitutions and statutes, acts that are primary ultra vires
are outside the scope of the pertinent authorizing instrument."
12. C. RHYNE, supra note 1, § 4.2.
13. 1A C. ANTIEAU, MUNICIPAL CORPORATION LAW § 10.13 (1984). Two reasons why
the ultra vires doctrine is used to control the work of public entities are: (1) courts are
afraid that municipalities will expand their own powers by contract rather than by legis-
lative grant, and (2) courts fear that public entities will abuse their contracting power
and subject taxpayers to extravagant risks and liabilities.
14. C. RHYNE, MUNICIPAL LAW. § 10-3 (1957). Rhyne describes a municipal obligation
incurred without a previous appropriation to pay for it, as an example of a contract that
is void and unenforceable.
15. See State v. City of Pullman, 23 Wash. 583, 590, 63 P. 265, 267 (1900). Rivalries
between communities for development during the settlement of the West in the late
nineteenth century spawned many schemes that impoverished some towns and
bankrupted others. Communities attempted to avoid paying for disadvantageous
arrangements by pleading that their actions were ultra vires and therefore unenforceable.
Early in Washington's history, the state supreme court recognized the dangers of unau-
thorized municipal actions. It is perhaps ironic that Pullman, one of the first applica-
tions of the ultra vires doctrine, shielded a municipal corporation from an unauthorized
contract with the state itself. Id. at 584, 63 P. at 265. Though the total value of the
contract was only $2,100, the decision illustrates the importance of the doctrine in limit-
ing the exercise of municipal power.
16. See Jones v. City of Centralia, 157 Wash. 194, 218, 289 P. 3, 11 (1930) (court
refers to municipal actions that are primary or secondary ultra vires to distinguish
between acts that a municipality has no authority to perform and those acts within its
lawful powers, but that are void because of an illegality in the procedures leading up to
the act). See supra note 4.
17. 10 E. McQuILLIN, THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 29.10 (3d ed. 1981)
(refers to such contracts as ultra vires "according to its strict and true construction").
Another commentator has stated that "(c]ontracts which are ultra vires in the strict or
proper sense are those which are not within the power of the municipality to make under
any circumstances, as distinguished from those .. .which are not entered into in a
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Consequently, a primary ultra vires contract is void and unen-
forceable."8 No performance by either party can give an unlawful
contract validity.19 More important, a party to a primary ultra
vires contract is foreclosed from seeking any quasi-contractual
relief.20
proper manner." C. RHYNE, supra note 14, § 10-3.
18. "Contracts which are ultra vires in the strict sense of that term are wholly
void." C. RHYNE, supra note 1, § 27.3.
19. 10 E. McQULLIN, supra note 17, § 29.10. The view taken by the Supreme Court
of the United States, and the only view that is consistent with legal principles, is as
follows:
A contract of a corporation, which is ultra vires, in the proper sense, that is to
say, outside the object of its creation as defined in the law of its organization,
and therefore beyond the powers conferred upon it by the legislature, is not
voidable only, but wholly void, and of no legal effect. The objection to the
contract is, not merely that the corporation ought not to have made it, but that
it could not make it. The contract cannot be ratified by either party, because it
could not have been authorized by either. No performance on either side can
give the unlawful contract any validity, or be the foundation of any right of
action upon it.
Central Transp. Co. v. Pullman Palace Car Co., 139 U.S. 24, 59-60 (1890).
In finding that an agreement was void as beyond the power of a water district and
contrary to the state constitution, one Washington court remarked:
Washington follows the rule that if a municipality contracts for a public
improvement.. . the agency providing the improvement is entitled to recover
its cost even though the contract is.ultra vires. However, no recovery is allowed
if the contract is malum in se, malum prohibitum, or manifestly violative of
public policy. We hold the agreement in this case was both malum prohibitum
and against public policy (citation omitted). Therefore recovery of the $12,000
cannot be obtained.
Whatcom County Water Dist. No. 4 v. Century Holdings, Ltd., 29 Wash. App. 207, 211,
627 P.2d 1010, 1013 (1981). See also Washington Educ. Ass'n v. Smith, 96 Wash. 2d 601,
610, 638 P.2d 77, 82 (1981) ("[E]stoppel will not be applied against a governmental body
whose acts are ultra vires and void .... [W]e find that the contract was ultra vires.
Therefore, the respondent is not bound."); Paul v. City of Seattle, 40 Wash. 294, 303, 82
P. 601, 605 (1905) ("[W]e conclude that no implied contract between the appellant and
the city existed, and also that no contract was ratified by the city .... [W]e believe the
better weight of modern authority is to the effect that no ... such estoppel exists.").
20. 10 E. McQUtLIN, supra note 17, § 29.10. According to McQuillin:
The fact that the other party to the contract has fully performed his part of
the agreement, or has expended money on the faith thereof, does not estop the
city from asserting ultra vires, nor is a municipality estopped to aver its inca-
pacity to make a contract by receiving benefits thereunder. That is, it cannot
be made liable either on the theory of estoppel or implied contract, where it
had no capacity to make the contract or where it was made in express violation
of law. Where a municipal corporation exceeds its powers in executing bonds,
its officers cannot by agreement, or by the payment of interest on such bonds,
estop the city from raising the question of the legality of the issue, since the
local corporation may defend on the ground that it had no legal authority to
execute and issue such bonds. The fact that the municipality may have
received the benefit of money raised on the bonds is immaterial.
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The classic application of the primary ultra vires doctrine
involves the invalidation of actions that directly contravene
express constitutional or statutory provisions. For instance, a
water district violated the doctrine when it obtained the support
of a private developer to expand the boundaries of the district in
exchange for deferring collection of an assessment .2 The agree-
ment was primary ultra vires because it expressly violated the
state constitution's prohibition on the lending of credit.2 Pri-
mary ultra vires has also been used to invalidate unauthorized
personal service contracts to market municipal bonds s and to
prohibit the state from making voluntary payroll deductions to
the political action committee of an employee's union.2 4 In each
of these cases the party that had contracted with the public
entity was denied any equitable relief.6
Other primary ultra vires cases contain more subjective
determinations of the public entity's authority. In State ex rel.
Id. § 29.104c.
21. Whatcom County Water Dist. No. 4 v. Century Holdings, Ltd., 29 Wash. App.
207, 210-11, 627 P.2d 1010, 1012-13 (1981). WASH. CONST. art. VIII, § 7 prohibits munici-
pal corporations from lending money or credit in aid of any individual or corporation
except for the necessary support of the poor or infirm. Whatcom, 29 Wash. App. at 211,
627 P.2d at 1012.
22. Whatcom County Water Dist. No. 4 v. Century Holdings, Ltd., 29 Wash. App.
207, 211, 627 P.2d 1010, 1012 (1981).
23. See Stoddard v. King County, 22 Wash. 2d 868, 880-81, 158 P.2d 78, 85 (1945)
(employment arrangement offered by one county commissioner, but not formally ratified
by the entire county commission, violated REM. REV. STAT. §§ 3984, 4072 (1931) and was
therefore ultra vires); Paul v. City of Seattle, 40 Wash. 294, 82 P. 601 (1905) (city comp-
troller retained plaintiff to market municipal bonds without a valid city council ordi-
nance, in violation of art. 4, §§ 27, 28 of the Seattle City Charter).
24. Washington Educ. Ass'n v. Smith, 96 Wash. 2d 601, 610, 638 P.2d 77, 82 (1981).
The court explained that WASH. Rov. CODE § 41.04.230 authorized state disbursement
officials to deduct money from the salaries and wages of state employees for credit
unions, parking fees, U.S. savings bonds, board, lodging, uniforms, membership dues for
public employees or professors, other labor or employee organization dues, and insurance
premiums. Id. at 604, 638 P.2d at 79. WASH. REv. CODE § 41.04.036 permitted deductions
for the United Fund. WASH. REv. CODE § 41.04.233 permitted deductions for health
maintenance organizations. WASH. Rav. CODE § 41.04.230 also permitted deductions "for
purposes clearly related to state employment or goals and objectives of the agency."
Wash. Educ. Ass'n, 96 Wash. 2d at 605, 638 P.2d at 79 (emphasis in original). The court
held that the action was ultra vires because there was no specific statutory provision
authorizing deductions for employee political action committee donations. Id. at 610, 638
P.2d at 82.
25. See Washington Educ. Ass'n v. Smith, 96 Wash. 2d 601, 638 P.2d 77 (1981);
Stoddard v. King County, 22 Wash. 2d 868, 158 P.2d 78 (1945); Paul v. City of Seattle,
40 Wash. 294, 82 P. 601 (1905); Whatcom County Water Dist. No. 4 v. Century Holdings,
Ltd., 29 Wash. App. 207, 627 P.2d 1010 (1981).
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PUD No. 1 v. Wylie,2 6 a public utility district attempted to
acquire all of the power-generating resources of a private electric
utility. The court concluded that the PUD's plan to sell $134
million in revenue bonds was ultra vires even though the dis-
trict's enabling statute authorized the acquisition of generating
resources outside its boundaries. The court reasoned that the
scope of the PUD's authority was limited to acquisitions that
were not unreasonably large or entirely inappropriate for pur-
poses of meeting its customers' electric energy needs.2 7
The harsh treatment of parties who enter into primary ultra
vires arrangements with public entities is grounded in funda-
mental common law assumptions about the difference between
public and private organizations.2 The acts of public agencies
and municipal corporations are matters of public record, and, as
such, their authority to act can be readily ascertained. Thus, all
who contract with a municipal corporation are charged with con-
structive knowledge of the public entity's authority and limita-
tions.29 The constructive knowledge theory can be traced to
26. 28 Wash. 2d 113, 182 P.2d 706 (1947).
27. Id. at 147, 182 P.2d at 723. The Skagit County Public Utility District contended
that it had the necessary authority under REM. REv. STAT. § 11610(d) (Rem. Supp. 1945)
to purchase electric current for sale and distribution and
to construct, condemn and purchase, purchase, acquire, add to, maintain, con-
duct and operate works, plants . . . and facilities for generating electric cur-
rent,. . . within or without its limits, for the purpose of furnishing said public
utility district, and the inhabitants thereof and any other person, including
public and private corporations, within or without its limits, with electric cur-
rent for all uses.
Wylie, 28 Wash. 2d at 139, 182 P.2d at 720 (quoting REM. REV. STAT. § 11610(d) (Rem.
Supp. 1945)). After an exhaustive analysis of the legislative history of the statute, the
court concluded that the statute's primary purpose was to provide electricity to the util-
ity's service area. Since Skagit PUD's customers consumed only five percent of the gen-
erating capacity that it sought to acquire, the court held that the action was inconsistent
with the purpose of the act. In the court's words: "There is nothing.. . which indicates
that the act was intended to give public utility districts the power to engage in business
beyond their limits on the grandiose scale here contemplated. ... Id. at 147, 182 P.2d
at 723.
28. "In considering contracts of public corporations the courts apply the ultra vires
rule with a greater degree of strictness than in the case of private corporations inasmuch
as the rights and interests of the citizens of the municipality are directly involved and
the question of public policy arises." C. RHYNE, supra note 1, § 27.3.
29. R. WHITTEN & P. BIRDWELL, THE CoNsTIrrTUoN AND THE COMMON LAW 118
(1977). The denial of both contract and quasi-contract relief for parties whose contract
with a public entity is held to be primary ultra vires is premised upon the fundamental
difference between the private and public sectors. See C. RHYNE, supra note 1, § 27.3.
Although corporations have long been organized and regulated under state and federal
statutes, their operating procedures have not been subject to full public disclosure. By
contrast, the powers, limitations, and contracting procedures of public sector entities are
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English common law and has been applied in the United States
for over a century.30 Washington State embraced this notion
long ago."
Courts have consistently concluded that the need to protect
citizens from the usually expensive consequences of unautho-
rized municipal actions outweighs the injustice wrought upon
the private contracting party. 2 Courts, therefore, deny equitable
remedies, such as equitable estoppel, against governmental enti-
ties that commit primary ultra vires acts.33
C. Secondary Ultra Vires
Courts apply a different form of the ultra vires doctrine to
invalidate contracts that are within the authority of a public
entity but that involve procedural irregularities in formation or
thought to be more ascertainable to contracting parties. But see 1A C. ANTMAu, supra
note 13, § 10.13:
[W]ith hundreds of cases every year litigating the existence and extent of
municipal powers and with the average city attorney himself in considerable
doubt as to the existence of many municipal powers, is it fair to impose upon a
citizen who would serve and benefit the city the requirement of exact knowl-
edge of the extent of municipal powers? It is suggested that it is not.
Id.
30. 6 C. FAIRMAN, THE HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES:
RECONSTRUCTION & REUNION 1864-88, PART ONE 932 n.54 (1971).
[T]he internal affairs of a private corporation are hidden from the outsider.
With a municipal corporation authorized to issue bonds upon compliance with
certain preliminaries, the practical situation is distinguishable: the petition,
the giving notice, the election and the canvass of returns are matters of record
open to the world.
Id. (quoting Royal British Bank v. Turquand, 6 E. & B. 327 (1856)).
31. In 1945 the Washington Supreme Court noted:
It is the general rule, and we have so announced, that, when dealing with an
officer or officers of a municipal corporation, one must be presumed to have
knowledge of the power and authority of such officer or officers, and that, when
he deals with such officer or officers in a manner not in compliance with the
law, he does so at his peril.
Stoddard v. King County, 22 Wash. 2d 868, 883, 158 P.2d 78, 86 (1945).
32. In arriving at this conclusion an early Washington court stated:
But we are not without precedent in our own decisions. In Arnott v. Spokane, 6
Wash. 442, 33 P. 1063 (1893), it was held, in common with universal authority,
that, wherever a person enters into a contract with an agent of a municipal
corporation, he must at his peril, ascertain the extent of such agent's authority,
and if he fails to do so, he alone must suffer the consequences.
State v. City of Pullman, 23 Wash. 583, 591, 63 P. 265, 267 (1900). Accord Stoddard v.
King County, 22 Wash. 2d 868, 158 P.2d 78 (1945).
33. Jones v. City of Centralia, 157 Wash. 194, 218-19, 289 P. 3, 10 (1930) (citing
State ex rel. Spring Water Co. v. Town of Monroe, 40 Wash. 545, 82 P. 888 (1905)).
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execution. 4 The Washington Supreme Court has described such
arrangements as secondary ultra vires. 6
Secondary ultra vires contracts are distinguishable from
their primary ultra vires counterparts because they stem from
legitimate exercises of authority and the courts may afford equi-
table relief."' Such actions are within the substantive authority
of the public entity and are undertaken in good faith for a tangi-
ble public benefit, but are executed in a statutorily deficient
manner.87 Equitable estoppel may be applied against a public
entity that commits a secondary ultra vires act.3 8 Thus, the pub-
lic entity cannot use the doctrine to shield itself from the conse-
quences of procedurally improper acts that are within its general
authority. Although a finding of secondary ultra vires invalidates
the contract, the private party often can obtain quasi-contrac-
tual relief.39
The Washington Supreme Court has adopted the aforemen-
tioned distinctions in applying the secondary ultra vires doc-
trine. Contracts for bridge40 and road41 construction, franchises
34. The Washington Supreme Court has stated:
This court has long recognized that in determining what acts of a governing
body are ultra vires and void, and thus immune from the application of the
doctrine of equitable estoppel, it must distinguish those acts which are done
wholly without legal authorization or in direct violation of existing statutes,
from those acts which are within the scope of broad governmental powers con-
ferred, granted, or delegated, but which powers have been exercised in an
irregular manner or through unauthorized procedural means.
Finch v. Matthews, 74 Wash. 2d 161, 172, 443 P.2d 833, 840.(1968).
35. Jones v. City of Centralia, 157 Wash. 194, 218, 289 P. 3, 11 (1930).
36. "Some courts have allowed recovery on the theory of implied contract where the
municipal corporation had the power to enter into the contract, but the contract was
unenforceable because not in proper form or irregularly executed." C. RHYNE, supra note
1, § 27.3.
37. 10 E. MCQUULLIN, supra note 17, § 29.10. "Where irregular contracts have been
performed in good faith for the benefit of the public, recovery thereon is usually permit-
ted." Id. McQuillin describes a secondary ultra vires contract as a contract that "is
merely ultra vires and not illegal." Id.
38. Id. McQuillin explains that recovery on such contracts is allowable on the theo-
ries of ratification, estoppel, or implied contract. Id.
39. Id. The ultra vires doctrine cannot be used by a municipal corporation to avoid
repaying money that it received and used. Id.
40. Green v. Okanogan County, 60 Wash. 309, 111 P. 226 (1910). In Green, the
supreme court held that the county's award of a contract for bridge construction without
previously advertising for bids violated REM. & BAL. CODES §§ 5585, 5680 (1910). The
court held that the contract was void, but because the contract, if entered into in con-
formity with the statutes, would have been valid, the court permitted the contractor to
retain the payments received. Green, 60 Wash. at 320-21, 111 P. at 230.
41. Besoloff v. Whatcom County, 133 Wash. 109, 113, 233 P. 284, 285 (1925). A sub-
sequent oral contract for work not included in the written bid violated REM. Comr. STAT.
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for the operation of street railways,42  and contracts for the
acquisition of electric power plants' 3 have all been recognized as
beneficial public acts within the authority of the sponsoring
public entity." In each instance, the public entity was author-
ized to contract for the service provided, but it had improperly
executed its authority. Nevertheless, the entities were required
to pay to the private party the reasonable value of the benefits
provided.
Application of the doctrine of equitable estoppel to secon-
dary ultra vires acts prevents public entities from profiting by
authorized, but procedurally improper, actions.45 The Washing-
ton Supreme Court recognized very early that it is manifestly
unjust to place the burden of guaranteeing a procedurally proper
§ 6616 (1922), which required that all construction of roads be performed according to
the terms of the contract. The oral contract was void, but the contractor was granted
recovery for the value of the extra work performed.
42. Spokane St. Ry. v. City of Spokane Falls, 6 Wash. 521, 33 P. 1072 (1893). The
city of Spokane Falls had granted the company a franchise to operate a street railroad on
certain named streets. The company had erroneously laid track on one street not named
in the ordinance. The city later passed an ordinance requiring the company to tear up
the rails on the unauthorized street. The court held that the city was estopped from
enforcing the ordinance because it had supervised the laying of the track and had
assessed and collected taxes on the improvements. Thus, the court declined to enforce
the explicit provisions of the authorizing ordinance. Id. at 525, 33 P. at 1073.
43. Jones v. City of Centralia, 157 Wash. 194, 219-20, 289 P. 3, 12 (1930) (payments
to contractor were made in good faith and represented the reasonable value of the bene-
fit conferred by completion of the dam).
44. The courts, however, seem to draw the line on defining a public benefit based
upon their interpretation of the agency's authority to act. For instance, in an early case
it was argued that the water system sought to be acquired provided public benefits over
both the short and long terms, but the court was interested in the motives behind the
acquisition. The city had received the beneficial use of the reservoir and piping system
during the term of the contract. State v. City of Pullman, 23 Wash. 583, 584, 63 P. 265,
265 (1900). But the court was not persuaded. It concluded that only the voters, not the
city itself, had the power to authorize this action. Id. at 592, 63 P. at 268. In contrast, in
another case the public benefit resulting from the secondary ultra vires contract figured
prominently in the decision to award the bridge contractor the reasonable value of the
work performed:
We are aware that there are cases holding that, where a statute has not been
complied with by the officers of a municipal corporation, there is no liability.
The injustice of such a rule is apparent where, as in this case, the county
retains a needed improvement which it had the power to make had it pursued
the mandate of the statute.
Green v. Okanogan County, 60 Wash. 309, 322, 111 P. 226, 230 (1910) (Gose, J., concur-
ring). Thus, the courts appear to use or disregard the public benefit element to the sec-
ondary ultra vires equation depending on the results to be substantiated.
45. Finch v. Matthews, 74 Wash. 2d 161, 176, 443 P.2d 833, 842 (1968). "[T]he rule
against estopping a governmental body should not be used as a device.. . to obtain
unjust enrichment or dishonest gains at the expense of a citizen." Id.
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contract on the party contracting with the public entity.48 To do
so would permit the public to receive the benefit of goods and
services without adhering to procedural requirements.47 In
recent years the subject has been addressed within the context
of the sovereign immunity debate. The argument made is that a
citizen has a right to expect the same standard of honesty and
fair dealing in contracts with public entities as is expected in
contracts between individuals.48
In Jones v. City of Centralia,9 the court recognized that
the expectations of private parties to a procedurally improper
municipal contract should be protected.50 The court stated that:
While laws vesting municipal corporations with statutory pow-
ers must be construed by the courts in such a manner as to
prevent municipal corporations from exercising powers not
conferred upon them by law, courts should not ... be overly
technical in determining just how and by what means munici-
palities shall exercise powers undoubtedly vested in them by
statute.5 1
The court applied this principle of statutory construction to
uphold the validity of an election by the people of Centralia
authorizing the issuance of bonds for construction of a dam.2
The election was, in fact, the second time that citizens had
approved the measure. The second election was necessary
because of irregularities in the ordinance authorizing the first
election. 3 Construction of the dam had already begun, and the
46. Jones v. City of Centralia, 157 Wash. 194, 222, 289 P. 3, 12 (1930). "We have also
held that, when a municipal corporation has accepted benefits under a contract, it is
estopped from denying liability thereon." Id. (citing Franklin County v. Carstens, 68
Wash. 176, 122 P. 999 (1912) and Mallory v. Olympia, 83 Wash. 499, 145 P. 627 (1915)).
47. Green v. Okanogan County, 60 Wash. 309, 111 P. 226 (1910) (Gose, J., concur-
ring). "The county cannot be held for more than the reasonable value of the work, and
the principles of common honesty, applicable alike to natural and artificial persons, for-
bid that it shall retain and use the bridge and pay a less [sic] sum." Id. at 322, 111 P. at
230.
48. Finch v. Matthews, 74 Wash. 2d 161, 176, 443 P.2d 833, 842 (1968). See Note,
Quasi-Contractual Recovery When Municipal Contract Is Ultra Vires, 41 WASH. L.
REv. 569 (1966). "Thus, holding a city liable on a contract implied on [sic] law appears
closely analogous to the recent demise of municipal immunity in the tort liability area; in
both instances the courts are endeavoring to hold municipalities to the same standard of
right and wrong the law imposes upon individuals." Id. at 573.
49. 157 Wash. 194, 289 P. 3 (1930).
50. Id. at 221-22, 289 P. at 12.
51. Id. at 219-20, 289 P. at 12.
52. Id. at 221, 289 P. at 12.
53. Id. at 197-98, 289 P. at 4.
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court, applying quantum meruit, held that the contractor was
entitled to retain the money that he had received. 5"
The Washington courts were not the first to recognize that
the harsh results of primary ultra vires actions are inappropriate
in a secondary ultra vires context. In making equitable remedies
available to private parties in secondary ultra vires situations,
the Washington Supreme Court relied upon nineteenth-century
United States Supreme Court decisions. Gelpcke v. City of
Dubuque5 was an influential decision that helped shape the sec-
ondary ultra vires doctrine. In Gelpcke, the United States
Supreme Court reversed the Iowa Supreme Court's invalidation
of the City of Dubuque's sale of $500,000 in bonds. The bond
revenue was used to purchase stock in two railroads to facilitate
construction of a north-south line through the city. The Panic of
1857 and the completion of rail lines at two other points on the
Mississippi, however, dimmed the promise of a bright economic
future. 56 In 1860 the city failed to meet interest payments on the
bonds.5 7
The Iowa court had concluded that the City of Dubuque's
sale of bonds to raise capital for the railroad violated two arti-
cles of the state constitution." The Supreme Court held that the
Iowa court had misconstrued the state constitution, had strayed
from its own previous decisions, and, in doing so, had impaired
an existing contractual obligation.5 9 Commentators have con-
cluded that in the post-Swift v. Tyson and pre-Erie Railroad v.
Tompkins era, the Gelpcke decision was binding precedent for
all jurisdictions.6
54. Id. at 222, 289 P. at 13.
55. 68 U.S. 175 (1863).
56. 6 C. FAIRMAN, supra note 30, at 935.
57. Id.
58. Gelpcke, 68 U.S. at 205.
59. The Court noted that from 1853 until 1859, the Iowa Supreme Court had upheld
similar arrangements between municipalities and railroads as constitutionally acceptable.
The Iowa court's abrupt change in position convinced the Court to deviate from its prac-
tice of following the latest adjudications of the highest court of a state on matters involv-
ing the construction of state law. Id. "It is the settled rule of this court in such cases, to
follow the decisions of the state courts. But. . . [wle shall never immolate truth, justice,
and the law, because a state tribunal has erected the altar and decreed the sacrifice." Id.
at 206-07.
60. 6 C. FAIRMAN, supra note 30, at 938-39. "Gelpcke v. Dubuque and Swift v.
Tyson may be bracketed as cases where the Supreme Court asserted its independence of
state court rulings on state law." Fairman argues, however, that the Court did not exer-
cise its independent judgment in Gelpcke because the Iowa court had overruled a prece-
dent and thereby destroyed an acquired right. Id. at 939 n.78.
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The United States Supreme Court further developed its
analysis of the ultra vires doctrine in Hitchcock v. Galveston.1
At issue was the Galveston City Council's authority to adopt an
ordinance allowing the mayor and the chairman of the streets
and alleys committee to contract for the curbing and paving of
sidewalks. The work was to be paid for by the sale of bonds. The
ordinance required the creation of a special fund into which pro-
ceeds from the increased property tax assessments would be
placed and then used to retire the debt.6 2
The Court concluded that the contracts were ultra vires but
that the city was obligated to pay for the work done." The
Court's analysis distinguished between "the case of an engage-
ment made by a corporation to do an act expressly prohibited by
its charter, or some other law, and a case of where legislative
power to do the act has not been granted."" The Court placed
the case in the latter category, concluding that the city's act was
unauthorized, but not prohibited, and therefore was "only ultravires."115
61. 96 U.S. 341 (1877).
62. Id. at 350.
63. In Hitchcock, the Court stated:
If payments cannot be made in bonds because their issue is ultra vires, it
would be sanctioning rank injustice to hold that payment need not be made at
all. . . .Having received benefits at the expense of the other contracting party,
it cannot object that it was not empowered to perform what it promised in
return, in the mode in which it promised to perform.
Id. at 350-51.
64. Id. at 351. In this case, it was conceded that the city had the authority to con-
struct sidewalks itself or contract for their construction. Id. at 348. The city urged, how-
ever, that the manner in which the work was to be financed, the sale of bonds, was ultra
vires because the total sale exceeded the allowable amount of the city's indebtedness for
such purposes. Id. at 349. The Court concluded that an action that was not expressly
prohibited by statute or charter should be honored.
[A]lthough there may be a defect of power in a corporation to make a contract,
yet if a contract made by it is not in violation of its charter, or of any statute
prohibiting it, and the corporation has by its promise induced a party relying
on the promise and in execution of the contract to expend money and perform
his part thereof, the corporation is liable on the contract.
Id. at 351 (citing State Bd. of Agriculture v. Citizens' State Ry., 47 Ind. 407 (1874)).
65. Hitchcock, 96 U.S. at 351. Five years later, the Court relied upon its analysis in
Hitchcock to invalidate a Nebraska county's purchase of a farm. Chapman v. Douglas
County, 107 U.S. 348, 357 (1882). The farm had been obtained from an individual under
the terms of a real estate contract that had included a promissory note. The county
wanted to construct a poorhouse on the site of the farm. Although the Court concluded
that the purpose of the acquisition was within the county's statutory powers, the con-
tract was held to be ultra vires because the use of a promissory note was not one of the
methods of purchase specifically authorized in the pertinent Nebraska statute. Id. at 353.
Since the illegality in the contract related not to the substance, but to the mode of per-
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The outline of the Court's reasoning in Hitchcock was visi-
ble in the early Washington ultra vires cases. In State v. Pull-
man,6e the Washington Supreme Court distinguished between
the authorized, but procedurally improper, actions in Hitchcock
and the complete absence of authority for the city of Pullman to
acquire a water system outside its boundaries.17 The court also
used the Hitchcock ultra vires reasoning in Turner Investment
Co. v. City of Seattle" to invalidate a street improvement con-
tract between the city and private property owners.0e
Courts recognize a certain hierarchy of statutory authority
with regard to governmental activities. Courts give the highest
level of deference to statutes that specifically grant or limit
authority by declaring that actions which contravene the statu-
tory mandates are primary ultra vires.70 Courts give far less def-
erence to statutes that merely describe the procedure under
which previously granted authority is to be executed.7 ' Breaches
of procedural statutes do not defeat contractual expectations,
provided that good faith and public benefit are established. 2
formance, the Court held that a restitution remedy was warranted. Id. at 355. Title to
the property was returned to the seller. The Court noted that the result was consistent
with a rule previously articulated by the Nebraska Supreme Court that cities obtaining
money without authority of law are duty-bound to refund it. Id. at 357.
66. 23 Wash. 583, 63 P. 265 (1900).
67. "[Blut the Supreme Court of the United States did not intend to lay down the
rule that, when a city exceeded its powers in a contract made by the authorities, the plea
of ultra vires could not be successfully interposed ... " Id. at 587, 63 P. at 266. See also
Green v. Okanogan County, 60 Wash. 309, 320, 111 P. 226, 229 (1910) (court, citing
Chapman v. Douglas County, 107 U.S. 348 (1882), said that acceptance of a bridge pur-
suant to an improperly executed contract obligated county to pay for its reasonable
value); Criswell v. Directors of School Dist. No. 24, 34 Wash. 420, 432, 75 P. 934, 937
(1904) (citing Chapman to support proposition that "if a contract is not unlawful...
common honesty requires payment of the reasonable value").
68. 70 Wash. 201, 126 P. 426 (1912).
69. The contract at issue in Turner obligated the city to pay for the street improve-
ments made by the plaintiff and for the city to establish an improvement district to pay
for these and other works, but exempted the plaintiffs from any assessments made by
the district. The court ruled that the city had no power to make such a contract, and
therefore the ultra vires rule applied in State v. City of Pullman, rather than the ultra
vires rule in Hitchcock, was appropriate. Id. at 208-09, 126 P. at 428.
70. See, e.g., Whatcom County Water Dist. No. 4 v. Century Holdings, Ltd., 29
Wash. App. 207, 627 P.2d 1010 (1981) (strict adherence to constitutional or statutory
language). See also State v. City of Pullman, 23 Wash. 583, 63 P. 265 (1900).
71. See, e.g., Finch v. Matthews, 74 Wash. 2d 161, 443 P.2d 833 (1968); Jones v.
Centralia, 157 Wash. 194, 289 P. 3 (1911); Green v. Okanogan County, 60 Wash. 309, 111
P.2d 226 (1910) (statutes that dictate contracting procedures did not preclude recovery
for services rendered).
72. Besoloff v. Whatcom County, 133 Wash. 109, 233 P. 284 (1925). In Besoloff, the
county had additional road work done under a procedurally improper oral contract. A
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The difficulty with this approach arises when the statute under
consideration has both substantive and procedural attributes. In
such cases, the court is forced to make difficult policy choices
about the value and the propriety of the governmental action
under review. In Edwards v. City of Renton 7 and Noel v. Cole,74
the court demonstrated an inclination to move mixed substan-
tive and procedural statutory violations into a secondary ultra
vires analysis.
III. RECENT MANIFESTATIONS OF THE DOCTRINE
A. Reasonable Expectations: Edwards v. City of Renton and
Noel v. Cole
In recent decades the Washington Supreme Court has con-
tinued to employ the distinction between primary and secondary
ultra vires actions. However, the court has attached additional
criteria to the remedial portion of the secondary ultra vires
analysis. The Washington Supreme Court introduced its
expanded analysis in Edwards v. City of Renton.7 5
In Edwards, the city contracted for the installation of a
traffic signal at an intersection, without calling for competitive
bids or budgeting funds for the project during the fiscal year in
which the services were rendered.7 The court held that the con-
tract was within the city's general authority, but that the city's
breach of the competitive bidding and budgeting statutes ren-
dered the contract secondary ultra vires." After finding that
neither the city nor the contractor acted in bad faith, the court
stated that in order to grant equitable relief, it must also find
that the action was not malum in se, malum prohibitum, or
manifestly against public policy.78
The additional test prescribed by the court in Edwards fur-
ther probes the question of good faith and provides the court
with latitude in using its equitable powers.7 9 Failure to prove
properly executed contract for the work already existed. The court held that the county
was obligated to pay for the work because it had accepted the work and received benefits
from it. Id. at 113, 223 P. at 285.
73. 67 Wash. 2d 598, 409 P.2d 153 (1965).
74. 98 Wash. 2d 375, 655 P.2d 245 (1982).
75. 67 Wash. 2d 598, 409 P.2d 153 (1965).
76. Id. at 600, 409 P.2d at 155.
77. Id. at 602, 409 P.2d at 156.
78. Id. at 603-04, 409 P.2d at 157.
79. The Edwards court relied on its analysis in several secondary ultra vires cases to
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that the public entity possessed general authority to act leads to
a presumption of bad faith, yet a finding of general authority
does not automatically warrant a presumption of good faith.80
The purpose of the action had to be tested against the new crite-
ria before it could be established that the action bore sufficient
good faith and that equity should be invoked.
The Edwards court's "good faith" analysis was especially
noteworthy because it led to a generous quasi-contract remedy
for the private party. The court reversed the trial court's award
to the contractor of the reasonable value of the benefits derived
by the city from installation of the traffic signal. The court held
instead that the proper measure of recovery, under an unjust
enrichment theory, was the reasonable value of the signal
itself.8, Thus, Edwards moved the secondary ultra vires doctrine
in the direction of fulfilling the reasonable expectations of pri-
vate parties contracting with public entities, a notion consistent
with the decline of the sovereign immunity doctrine.82
In Noel v. Cole,8 the court vigorously affirmed the ultra
vires analysis adopted in Edwards. Noel, like Edwards, involved
applications of the secondary ultra vires doctrine. In Noel, how-
ever, the public entity was a seller rather than a purchaser of
goods. The Department of Natural Resources (DNR), the agency
charged with management of the state's timberlands, advertised
and sold a tract of timber pursuant to its statutory authority.8 '
support its award to the plaintiff. Id. at 604, 409 P.2d at 157-58. The court referred
primarily to Abrams v. Seattle, 173 Wash. 495, 23 P.2d 869 (1933). In Abrams, an indi-
vidual who advanced money, labor, and materials for the construction of an electrical
substation on city property under an ultra vires lease was awarded the reasonable value
of the goods and services the city received. Id. at 500, 23 P.2d at 871. The court qualified
its application of the secondary ultra vires approach in Edwards in the following way-.
In applying the approach of the Abrams case ... to the instant case, we do so
with the understanding that the transaction involved is devoid of any bad
faith, fraud, or collusion and that "financial arrangements" such as here evi-
denced are not usually indulged in by political subdivisions of the state.
Should the contrary ever appear, it could well be that the dictates of public
policy would require a more stringent approach.
Edwards, 67 Wash. 2d at 606, 409 P.2d at 159.
80. The court was unwilling to grant equitable relief whenever public entities vio-
lated procedural statutes. It insisted on yet another analytical step, a determination of
whether elements of bad faith were present in the circumstances of the transaction.
Edwards, 67 Wash. at 606, 409 P.2d at 158-59. Thus, equitable relief was available only
for secondary ultra vires contracts that were entered into in good faith.
81. Id. at 607, 409 P.2d at 159.
82. See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
83. 98 Wash. 2d 375, 655 P.2d 245 (1982).
84. The Commissioner of Public Lands, as the publicly elected administrator of the
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Three months later a group of intervenors obtained an order
temporarily restraining road construction and timber harvesting
on the grounds that the DNR had not prepared an environmen-
tal impact statement.8 5 The order was later made permanent.8 6
The purchaser then filed a cross-claim against the DNR for
breach of contract.8 7
The DNR maintained that it had followed all appropriate
regulations promulgated by the State Council on Environmental
Policy and the Department of Ecology implementing the SEPA
regulations. The Council had issued regulations exempting most
state timber sales from compliance with the substantive portions
of the SEPA regulations."8 The DNR argued further that it had
justifiably relied upon the validity of the exemption in annually
processing between 250 and 400 timber sales.8 9
The Washington Supreme Court acknowledged the trial
court's determination that the SEPA regulations were invalid
and concluded that the DNR's failure to follow statutorily man-
dated environmental review made the contract ultra vires.90 The
court initiated its discussion of ultra vires by contrasting the
doctrine's use in private contracts with its application in public
contracts.' 1 The analogy was particularly appropriate given the
proprietary nature of the agency's actions.' Following recitation
of the Edwards ultra vires analysis, the court distinguished
between actions in which an agency lacks any power to contract
in the government's name (primary ultra vires) and the more
commonplace situation in which the agency fails to follow proce-
dural requirements (secondary ultra vires) .3
agency, is authorized to select stands of timber to be sold at public auction. See WASH.
REV. CODE §§ 79.01.124, .200 (1983) ("[A]II sales of valuable materials shall be at public
auction or by sealed bid to the highest bidder. .. ").
85. Noel, 98 Wash. 2d at 378, 655 P.2d at 248.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. See WASH. ADMIN. CODE §§ 197-10-170(19), -175(4) (1980).
89. Noel, 98 Wash. 2d at 382 n.4, 655 P.2d at 250 n.4.
90. Id. at 382, 655 P.2d at 250. The trial court had awarded the plaintiff damages
for breach of contract. Since the Washington Supreme Court held that the contract was
ultra vires, the quasi-contract unjust enrichment remedy was substituted for the trial
court's breach of contract award.
91. Id. at 378-79, 655 P.2d at 248, "In the corporate sphere, the ultra vires doctrine
has come under increasing disfavor .... In actions against governmental entities, how-
ever, the doctrine retains its vitality." Id.
92. See supra note 84.
93. Noel, 98 Wash. 2d at 379, 655 P.2d at 248. "More commonly, an agency steps
outside its authority by failure to comply with statutorily mandated procedures. One
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The court viewed the SEPA regulations as a procedural,
rather than a substantive, requirement for the sale of timber.9 4
The court compared the DNR's noncompliance with the SEPA
statute to government purchases in violation of spending guide-
lines and procedures.9 5 It viewed SEPA as establishing procedu-
ral requirements that attached to all timber sale activities. The
court concluded that the DNR had no authority to sell timber
without adhering to SEPA's environmental impact statement
mandate.9 6 The court acknowledged that the legislature had
granted general authority to sell state timber.9 7 Had the environ-
mental analysis been completed, the sale would have been
proper."
The court applied the second part of the Edwards test to
determine whether the action was malum in se, malurn prohib-
itum, or manifestly against public policy. It found that both par-
ties had acted in good faith and held that recovery for the pur-
chaser was necessary to prevent unjust enrichment." The
purchaser was awarded the reasonable value of the road con-
struction that it had completed prior to the injunction, reduced
only by the purchaser's profit on the timber removed. 00
The Noel decision was faithful to the ultra vires analysis in
Edwards. In both cases the court found sufficient statutory
authority for each agency's action.101 Traffic control in Edwards,
and timber sales in Noel, were actions within the broad statu-
such set of procedures is that provided by SEPA." Id.
94. Id. at 382, 655 P.2d at 250.
95. Id. at 379-80, 655 P.2d at 249. "The ultra vires doctrine is just as necessary to
prevent ill considered environmental action as it is to prevent ill considered financial
action." Id.
96. Id. at 382, 655 P.2d at 250.
97. Id. at 380, 655 P.2d at 249.
98. Id. at 381, 655 P.2d at 250.
99. Id. The court held further:
If these two conditions are satisfied, a private party acting in good faith may
recover to the extent necessary to prevent 'manifest injustice' or unjust enrich-
ment. . . .Thus, DNR did not lack substantive authority to make this sale,
but merely carried it out in an unauthorized procedural manner. . . Neither
can we say that DNR's action was malum in se, malum prohibitum or mani-
festly against public policy .... Finally, there is no evidence of bad faith on
the part of Alpine. . . .In sum, Alpine is entitled to recover under a theory of
unjust enrichment.
Id. at 381-82, 655 P.2d at 250.
100. Id. at 382-83, 655 P.2d at 250.
101. Edwards, 67 Wash. 2d at 602, 409 P.2d at 156; Noel, 98 Wash. 2d at 380, 655
P.2d at 249.
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tory authority of the entitites 0 2 However, six months after
Noel, in Chemical Bank v. Washington Public Power Supply
System, 0 3 the court departed dramatically from this analysis of
the authority question and became "overly technical"'"' in
determining the scope of municipal power.
C. Statutory Authority Narrowly Construed: Chemical Bank
v. Washington Public Power Supply System
1. The Decision
In Chemical Bank v. Washington Public Power Supply
System, 105 trustees for individuals and institutions that had pur-
chased $2.25 billion in bonds from the Washington Public Power
Supply System (WPPSS) sought a declaratory judgment against
the consortium of municipal utilities, rural electric cooperatives,
and public utility districts that had contracted with WPPSS for
the construction of two nuclear plants. The trustees argued that
the utilities were obligated to pay their share of the bond obliga-
tion despite termination of the plants' construction. The central
issue was the utilities' authority to enter into an agreement with
WPPSS under contract terms that obligated the utilities to pay
their proportionate share of the facilities regardless of whether
the plants ultimately produced electricity.'" Litigation began
after several of the participants refused to pay their share as
interest payments on the bonds became due.107
102. See Edwards, 67 Wash. 2d at 602, 409 P.2d at 156; Noel, 98 Wash. 2d at 380,
655 P.2d at 249. In both cases, the ultimate purpose of the two ultra vires tests was to
ensure that the transactions were made in good faith. Compare Edwards, 67 Wash. 2d at
606, 409 P.2d at 159 ("In applying the approach of the Abrams case. . . to the instant
case, we do so with the understanding that the transaction involved is devoid of any bad
faith, fraud, or collusion. . . .") with Noel, 98 Wash. 2d at 382, 655 P.2d at 250
("Finally, there is no evidence here of bad faith on the part of Alpine.").
103. 99 Wash. 2d 772, 666 P.2d 329 (1983).
104. See Jones v. City of Centralia, 157 Wash. 194, 220, 289 P. 3, 12 (1930) ("courts
should not, on the other hand, be overly technical in determining just how and by what
means municipalities shall exercise powers undoubtedly vested in them by statute").
105. 99 Wash. 2d 772, 666 P.2d 329 (1983).
106. Id. at 778, 666 P.2d at 332 (quoting § 6(d) of the Participants' Agreement
between the Supply System and the Utilities: "The Participant shall make the payments
to be made to the Supply System... whether or not any of the Projects are completed,
operable or operating and notwithstanding the suspension, interruption, interference,
reduction or curtailment of the output of either Project for any reason whatsoever in
whole or in part.").
107. Id. at 776, 666 P.2d at 331.
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2. The Rationale
The court examined four avenues for legal authority to vali-
date the agreements: (1) statutes granting to municipalities and
public utility districts authority to acquire electricity; 8 (2) stat-
utes granting authority to acquire electric generating facilities;'"
(3) statutes granting authority to enter into joint operating
agreements with joint development agencies;110 and (4) the doc-
trine of implied municipal authority."1 The court ultimately
held that the participants lacked the substantive authority to
enter into the agreements.1 12'
The court set the stage for its analysis by concluding that
the agreements were unconditional obligations for the purchase
of a portion of the projects' capability rather than contracts for
the purchase of electricity.118 Once this distinction was made,
the court looked for an express statutory grant of authority for
the acquisition of project capability." 4 The court excluded from
consideration all statutes granting the utilities authority to sell
electricity.' These statutes contained general language author-
izing the utilities to provide street lighting and electricity, but
108. Id. at 782, 666 P.2d at 334.
109. Id. at 784, 666 P.2d at 335.
110. Id. at 794, 666 P.2d at 340-41. See WAsH. RaV. CODE § 54.44.010 (1983), par-
tially quoted infra note 132. See also WASH. REv. CODE § 54.44.020 (1983) (authorizing
first class cities, public utility districts, and joint operating agencies to participate in the
operation of common facilities).
111. 99 Wash. 2d at 791, 666 P.2d at 339.
112. Id. at 798, 666 P.2d at 342.
113. Id. at 783-84, 666 P.2d at 335. The court held:
IT]he purchase of 'project capability' under this agreement is essentially an
unconditional guaranty of payments on the revenue bonds, secured by a pledge
of the participants' utility revenues, in exchange for a share of any power gen-
erated by these projects. The agreement expressly provides for the possibility
that no electricity will be generated and that participant payments will be due
even if the project is not completed. The unconditional obligation to pay for no
electricity is hardly the purchase of electricity. We hold that an agreement to
purchase project capability does not qualify as a purchase of electricity.
Id.
114. The court concluded that the utilities' right to a specific portion of project
capability, defined under section 1(v) of the Participants' Agreement as "the amounts of
electric power and energy, if any, which the Projects are capable of generating at any
particular time" was not an acceptable form of ownership under the utilities' authorizing
statutes. Id. at 777-78, 666 P.2d at 332. "Here, the municipal and PUD participants were
not acquiring or constructing generating facilities as set out in the statutes because
under the agreement, they ceded virtually all their ownership interest and most of the
management responsibilities to WPPSS." Id. at 788, 666 P.2d at 338.
115. Id. at 789, 666 P.2d at 338.
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none used language any more precise than "purchase," "acquisi-
tion," "ownership," or "maintenance" to describe the means for
accomplishing this purpose. 1 Some of the general authorization
statutes cited by the court detailed additional procedural
requirements for contracting,11 but none of the statutes con-
tained language expressly prohibiting the purchase of project
capability or any other specific manner of resource acquisition.
The court also concluded that the utilities lacked implied
powers to enter into the agreements.1 The court, relying upon
the Edwards standard that the power to borrow money will not
be inferred from general grants of statutory authority to incur
indebtedness, 19 determined that the joint development statutes
failed to grant sufficient authority upon which a claim of implied
powers could be sustained.12 0
3. A Departure from Edwards
Although the court relied on Edwards to anchor the implied
powers analysis, the court did not, as it had in Edwards, pursue
the distinction between the purpose for which the funds were
obtained and the manner in which they were obtained. 12 This
distinction was crucial to the ultra vires analysis in Edwards. By
concluding that the purpose of the contract for the traffic light
116. See WASH. REv. CODE § 35.22.280(15) (1983) (authorizing first class cities "[tlo
provide for lighting the streets and all public places, and for furnishing the inhabitants
thereof with gas or other lights, and to erect, or otherwise acquire, and to maintain the
same, or to authorize the erection and maintenance of such works as may be necessary
and convenient therefor."); WASH. REV. CODE § 35.23.440(44) (1983) (authorizing second
class cities to provide similar services provided that no purchase of a plant is made with-
out a vote of the electorate); WASH. REv. CODE § 54.16.040 (1983) (authorizing public
utility districts "to purchase electric current for sale and distribution. . . construct, con-
demn and purchase . . . acquire, add to, maintain, conduct and operate works, plants
* .. for the purpose of furnishing the district, and the inhabitants . . . with electric
current.").
117. See WASH. REv. CODE § 54.44.020 (1983) (requiring that each participant shall
own a percentage of the common facility and defray its own interest and other
payments).
118. 99 Wash. 2d at 794, 666 P.2d at 340. "Accordingly, we do not believe that this
agreement is authorized as an implied power to pay for an admittedly proper municipal
service." Id.
119. Edwards, 67 Wash. 2d at 601-02, 409 P.2d at 156.
120. Chemical Bank, 99 Wash. 2d at 793-94, 666 P.2d at 340.
121. The Edwards court clearly concluded that the city had the necessary authority
to enter the contract. "Though the purpose for which the fumds were to be expended can
be characterized as infra vires, the manner in which the funds were obtained was ultra
vires, and the purported repayment agreement was accordingly void." 67 Wash. 2d at
602, 409 P.2d at 156.
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was within the general authority of the city, the court was able
to reach the threshold of the secondary ultra vires doctrine and
ultimately conclude that an equitable remedy was appropriate.
The bidding and budgeting statutes that the city had violated in
Edwards enumerated the procedural requirements in greater
detail than most of the statutes governing the acquisition of
electric energy.12 2 The Edwards decision did not include a
lengthy review of the statutes governing second class cities for
the purpose of identifying express authority to acquire street
lights. The court made such a review, however, in Chemical
Bank. The court insisted that authority to purchase electricity
or power plants was not sufficiently similar to the ownership
arrangement established by the participants' agreement to cross
the primary ultra vires threshold and reach the issue of whether
the parties to the agreement deserved quasi-contractual relief. 28
In Edwards and Noel,12 4 the court interpreted the statutes
in a manner that permitted differentiation of the substantive
authority and the procedural aspects of the contracts.125 The
court was willing to downplay express statutory mandates in
authorizing legislation 26 or in other statutes 2 " to effectuate the
122. Compare WASH. REV. CODE § 35.23.352 (1983) with statutes authorizing the
acquisition of electric energy, supra note 110.
Any second or third class city or any town may construct any public work or
improvement by contract or day labor without calling for bids . . . whenever
the estimated cost of such work. . . will not exceed the sum of fifteen thou-
sand dollars. Whenever the cost of such public work or improvement ... will
exceed fifteen thousand dollars, the same shall be done by contract. All such
contracts shall be let at public bidding upon posting notice calling for sealed
bids upon the work.
WASH. RE v. CODE § 35.23.352 (1983).
123. See supra note 113.
124. The language of the statute authorizing the sale of timber from educational
trust lands was a broad delegation of power. WASH. REV. CODE § 79.01.094 (1983) ("The
board of state land commissioners shall exercise general supervision and control over the
sale or lease for any purpose of land granted to the state for educational purposes and
also over the sale of timber, fallen timber, stone, gravel and all other valuable materials
situated thereon. .. ").
125. See Edwards, 67 Wash. 2d at 602, 409 P.2d at 156-57; Noel, 98 Wash. 2d at
382, 655 P.2d at 250.
126. In Edwards, the court downplayed the significance of the city's violation of the
contracting procedures in WASH. REV. CODE § 35.23.352 (1965) and § 35.33.120 (1965) by
urging that they pertained more to the manner in which the contracts were executed
than to the "purpose, intent and spirit" of the statute. 67 Wash. 2d at 602, 409 P.2d at
156.
127. In Noel, the court dismissed the department's failure to comply with SEPA as
"merely a failure to comply with a procedural, albeit important, requirement." 98 Wash.
2d at 382, 655 P.2d at 250. The provisions of SEPA apply to all branches of state govern-
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broader purpose. The court did not do this in Chemical Bank,
even though the actions in question did not involve contraven-
tion of express statutory language. The delineation between sub-
stance and procedure with respect to the participants' agree-
ment was plainly evident. The court would have found a
convincing case for providing relief "to the extent necessary to
prevent manifest injustice 12 8 had it completed the Edwards and
Noel ultra vires analysis. The statutes granting to the state land
commissioner the power to sell timber, and to the city of Renton
the power to make street improvements, convey general author-
ity in language similar to the statutes authorizing municipalities
and public utility districts to provide electric service.12 '
The Chemical Bank opinion lacked any references to
instances of bad faith, fraud, or collusion, either by the utilities
or by the bondholders. Neither the Edwards analysis nor the
nineteenth-century approach 80 to the ultra vires doctrine pre-
cluded application of quasi-contract remedies in cases in which
legitimate general authority was found without further
inquiry.131 Never before has the court been so meticulous in its
search for authority to contract.
If it had applied the Edwards analysis, the court's next step
would have been to consider whether the participants' agree-
ments were malum in se, malum prohibitum, or manifestly
against public policy. The first two criteria, as tests of good
faith, appear to be fulfilled by the legislature's statutory declara-
tion that the formation of joint operating agencies by cities and
ment. WASH. REv. CODE § 43.21C.030(2) (1983). The language of the act indicated that
its mandate was substantive. See WASH. REV. CODE § 43.21C.030(1) (1983) ("The legisla-
ture authorizes and directs that, to the fullest extent possible . . . [t]he policies, regula-
tions, and laws of the state of Washington shall be interpreted and administered in
accordance with the policies set forth in this chapter .. "). Thus, the court must have
been willing to subordinate both the substantive and procedural mandates of SEPA to
effectuate the purposes of the state timber sales program.
128. Finch v. Matthews, 74 Wash. 2d 161, 175, 443 P.2d 833, 842 (1968).
129. Compare WASH. REV. CODE § 79.01.124 (1983) ("Timber... may be sold ...
when in the judgment of the commissioner of public lands, it is for the best interest of
the state so to sell the same") with WASH. REv. CODE § 35.92.050 (1983) (authorizes cities
to "construct.. .purchase, acquire. . . and operate. .. [plants and facilities] for the
purpose of furnishing the city ... and its inhabitants ... (with electricity]" and grants
municipalities the power to "authorize the construction of such plant or plants by others
for the same purpose.").
130. See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
131. See Edwards, 67 Wash. 2d at 603-04, 409 P.2d at 157. See also Chapman v.
Douglas County, 107 U.S. 348, 355 (1882).
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public utility districts is in the public interest. 3 2 The partici-
pants' agreements represented a course of action consistent with
the legislative declaration. 33 A second act of the legislature,
requiring all municipal corporations that had contracted with an
operating agency to participate in the construction or acquisi-
tion of an energy plant to adopt annually a plan for repayment
of its share of the total obligation,3 4 indicated that the legisla-
ture was aware of the provisions of the utilities' contractual obli-
gations and that it expected the utilities to honor those
obligations.
The third criterion of the Edwards good faith test, whether
the agreements were manifestly against public policy, requires
balancing the benefits of allowing public entities to act collec-
tively to meet the energy needs of their constituents against the
risks associated with large construction projects. The court
raised public policy concerns over the ownership and manage-
ment structure established by the participants' agreement, but
these issues were subsumed within the statutory authority
analysis. 3 5 The court did not specifically conclude that the
agreement was manifestly against public policy because the stat-
utes authorizing joint developments did not specify how the
management structure should be organized. " '
The court considered the very scale of the projects as a sep-
arate public policy issue.1 37 In connection with this issue, the
132. It is declared to be in the public interest and for a public purpose that
cities of the first class, public utility districts, joint operating agencies ...
regulated electric companies and, rural electric cooperatives . . . be permitted
to participate together in the development of nuclear and other thermal power
facilities and transmission facilities . . . to meet the future power needs of the
state and all its inhabitants.
WASH. REV. CODE § 54.44.010 (1983). See also WASH. REv. CODE § 54.44.900 (1983) ("The
provisions of this chapter shall be liberally construed to effectuate the purposes
thereof.").
133. WAsH. REV. CODE § 54.44.010 (1983).
134. Any municipal corporation, cooperative or mutual which has entered into
a contract with an operating agency to participate in the construction or acqui-
sition of an energy plant.. . shall annually adopt a plan for the repayment of
its contractual share of any operating agency obligation which matures prior to
the planned operation of the plant ...
WASH. REV. CODE § 43.52.550 (1983).
135. "As a matter of public policy, the enormous risk to ratepayers must be bal-
anced by either the benefit of ownership or substantial control." Chemical Bank, 99
Wash. 2d at 788, 666 P.2d at 337.
136. See supra notes 113, 132.
137. Chemical Bank, 99 Wash. 2d at 778, 666 P.2d at 338-39.
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court referred to its holding in State ex rel. PUD No. 1 v.
Wylie.138 In Wylie, the court had concluded that a public utility
district's attempted acquisition of electric generating capacity
far in excess of its needs was ultra vires.139 However, comparison
to Wylie was inappropriate given the forecasts of substantial
load growth and future capacity shortages that existed at the
time the WPPSS agreements were signed. 40 Moreover, the court
did not consider the most disturbing public policy issue arising
out of the decision: the potentially far-reaching effects of the
largest default in the history of the municipal bond market.
Although there was much more money at stake in Chemical
Bank than in Edwards and Noel, the public policy debate came
down to essentially the same issue: whether the participants
acted reasonably and in good faith in deciding to participate.
Had the court adhered to the reasoning and the ultra vires
analysis applied in Edwards and Noel, it would have answered
the question in the affirmative. The ultra vires conduct in
Chemical Bank, according to the court, involved violations of
statutes pertaining to the manner in which ownership and pay-
ment were to be organized in joint developments, not to the
legitimacy of joint developments themselves. Both Edwards and
Noel suffered from similar irregularities in the manner of per-
forming authorized endeavors, yet sufficient evidence of good
faith existed to justify granting the contracting parties a remedy.
The plaintiffs in Chemical Bank deserved a similar remedy.
If the court had expressly abandoned the Edwards ultra
vires analysis and instead applied the standard it borrowed from
the Supreme Court early in the century, 14 1 the court would have
found it necessary to prevent "manifest injustice" by fashioning
a quasi-contractual remedy. Acquisition of electric energy is
within the purpose of the enabling statute, and the imposition of
138. 28 Wash. 2d 113, 182 P.2d 706 (1947).
139. Id. at 151-52, 182 P.2d at 726-27.
140. The court said that the primary purpose of the PUD statutes at issue in Wylie
was to furnish electricity to the district and its inhabitants. The actions of the PUD in
joining the consortium expressly furthered this purpose. The PUD's actions in Wylie
were held ultra vires because generating capacity sought to be acquired far exceeded the
utility's existing and projected load growth. The court acknowledged that these circum-
stances were considerably different for the PUD participants in Plants 4 and 5. Chemical
Bank, 99 Wash. 2d at 789, 666 P.2d at 338.
141. Hitchcock v. Galveston, 96 U.S. 341 (1877). "It matters not that the promise
was to pay in a manner not authorized by law. If payments cannot be made in bonds
because their issue is ultra vires, it would be sanctioning rank injustice to hold that
payment need not be made at all. Such is not the law." Id. at 350.
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a remedy would have been necessary to prevent the public agen-
cies from benefiting from authorized, but procedurally improper,
acts. 4 2 Additional review for evidence of bad faith was not part
of the earlier secondary ultra vires tests.
Finally, an argument might be made that an equitable rem-
edy is more appropriate in situations where a public agency
commits procedural irregularities in the execution of proprietary
functions than when it errs in the performance of ministerial
duties. The principle that a contracting party should be consid-
ered to have constructive knowledge of the scope of municipal
power is somewhat more persuasive when the purpose of the
contract is in furtherance of a ministerial duty. Conversely,
when public entities are selling goods, such as timber, or provid-
ing services, such as electric power, that are not fundamentally
ministerial, the agency should be held to the standards of con-
tracts and contract remedies available to private parties. 43
Under this line of reasoning, a remedy would be more appropri-
ate in Noel and in Chemical Bank than in Edwards, in which
the city was discharging its ministerial function of traffic control.
IV. CONCLUSION
One of the results of the Chemical Bank decision was to
tighten the reins on the scope of municipal power. Such a result
is consistent with a recent line of cases in which the Washington
Supreme Court invalidated actions of other municipal corpora-
tions. 44 The ultra vires doctrine is an appropriate means by
which a court can accomplish this purpose.
Legitimate concern arises, however, when a powerful legal
doctrine is applied in an inconsistent manner. In Chemical
Bank, the court did not adhere to the analysis it had previously
used when invoking the doctrine. The court was overly technical
in reviewing the means by which municipalities should exercise
their vested powers. The court failed to draw from the statutes
142. See Jones v. City of Centralia, 157 Wash. 194, 222, 289 P. 3, 12 (1930). See
supra notes 4, 16.
143. Finch v. Matthews, 74 Wash. 2d 161, 176, 443 P.2d 833, 842 (1968).
144. See Hillis Homes, Inc. v. Snohomish County, 97 Wash. 2d 804, 650 P.2d 193
(1982) (court invalidated fees on new residential developments to pay for services neces-
sitated by population increases); In re Seattle, 96 Wash. 2d 616, 638 P.2d 549 (1981)
(city lacks authority to condemn property for the purpose of promoting private retail-
ing); Port of Seattle v. Washington Utils. & Transp. Comm'n, 92 Wash. 2d 789, 597 P.2d
383 (1979) (port service cannot offer its own transportation service to airport).
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that it reviewed the scope of the legislative mandate to munici-
pal utilities and public utility districts.145 The change in the
court's approach to the ultra vires doctrine is destined to create
confusion in the minds of those who contract with public enti-
ties in Washington. The burden of the decision will likely fall on
the legislature, which may have to become a strict parent to its
municipal corporation offspring. Given the new unpredictability
in the ultra vires doctrine, cities and counties may reach the
conclusion that no action is safe unless the legislature expressly
says it is safe. Thus, the legislature may be forced to allocate
considerably more time to the organization and management
problems of municipal corporations. Neither the municipal cor-
porations nor the legislature will likely applaud this prospect.
Grant Degginger
145. This was especially perplexing because at the beginning of its opinion, the
court recited the principle of statutory construction that language within a statute must
be read in context with the entire statute and construed in a manner consistent with the
general purposes of the statute. Chemical Bank, 99 Wash. at 782, 666 P.2d at 334.
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